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LABOR MARKET DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REFORM
Roger Barker and David Rueda

I. INTRODUCTION
The joint stock company is one of the most successful
socioeconomic institutions of modern society. Along with markets,
firms serve to mobilize and coordinate the use of capital in the
generation of economic growth (Roberts 2004: 74). However, unlike
markets, firms organize production in terms of hierarchical
authority relations between economic agents (Coase 1937). Their
pervasiveness in modern economic life is arguably even greater
than that of markets: according to McMillan, 70% of transactions in
the US economy occur within firms, as compared to only 30% in
markets (McMillan 2002:168).
The dangers inherent in the concept of the limited liability
company received an early treatment from Adam Smith in The
Wealth of Nations (1776). Two and a half centuries later, the
underlying problem remains the same: the distinctive legal
structure of the corporation offers corporate insiders an
opportunity to enrich themselves at the expense of other
stakeholders. Such a moral hazard problem creates significant
dangers for overall societal welfare and stability, given the central
role played by firms in the production structure of most political
economies. Societies wishing to enjoy the firm’s economic benefits
have to decide, either explicitly or implicitly, which actors can be
trusted to exercise power over the firm, and how that power will be
restricted and held accountable.
The authority structure of a firm can be organized in a variety of
ways. The possible range of permutations has been reflected in the
post-war diversity of national corporate governance practices,
which appear to have defied the harmonizing effects of economic
globalization (Stulz 2005; Dyck and Zingales 2004; Nenova 2003).
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For example, a distinctive approach to corporate governance has
underpinned the non-liberal economic models of continental
Europe. European corporations have operated within a framework
of incentives that have shielded them from engagement in shortterm earnings and share-price maximization. This has facilitated
their cooperation with other social actors in fulfillment of the postwar “corporatist compromise”. More stable corporate behavior has
also given rise to an environment in which economic actors are
more willing to engage in long-term commitments and non-market
forms of cooperation (e.g. in training, R&D, industrial relations,
etc). This proved to be a particularly efficient form of economic
organization in the post-war era of “diversified quality production”
(Streeck 1992).
There is, however, evidence of significant change underway in
European corporate governance, particularly since the mid-1990s.
Most European countries have introduced national codes of
corporate governance for the first time, along with a range of
regulatory changes to improve company disclosure, board
accountability and minority shareholder rights. At the micro-level,
more and more companies are seeking to project an image of
“good” corporate governance, in order to secure cheaper finance
and a higher share price. In addition, supranational institutions,
such as the European Commission, have been active in promoting
some degree of harmonization in corporate governance regulations,
for example through passage of the 2003 Takeover Directive.
With respect to Europe’s largest economy - Germany—Beyer and
Höpner (2003) also argue that significant change is underway in
corporate governance (in contrast to the “Reformstau” in other
policy areas). At the company level, shareholder orientation is
being increased through the use of profitability goals, measures to
increase financial transparency, investor relations activities and the
increased use of stock options (Beyer and Höpner 2003: 179). The
amendment of German corporate law in 1998 to include the
“protection of shareholder value” as a valid corporate objective for
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the first time in German history is praised by Espen Eckbo as “a
giant step forward for German corporate governance. Adam Smith
would have approved” (Eckbo 2005: 3).
The objective of this paper is to explain both the diversity that
exists in corporate governance regimes, and account for why it may
be changing.

II. WHAT ARE WE TRYING TO EXPLAIN?
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHANGE IN
INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES.
Corporate governance is an attribute of political economies that
varies significantly across countries (La Porta et al 1999; Morck and
Steier 2005). It also varies significantly across time (Rajan and
Zingales 2003; Becht and Delong 2004; Morck at al 2004), although
it is argued that there is also a high level of path dependence in the
short-to-medium term.
In the previous section we have hinted at some of the reasons why
corporate governance matters to the political economy of
industrialized democracies. Let us be a little more systematic about
these reasons. First, the fact that the structure of firms differs
significantly among different countries affects their response to
common external challenges (Morck and Steier 2005; Roe 2003; Hall
and Soskice 2001; Knetter 1989). Numerous authors have argued
convincingly that corporate governance is, in fact, a key factor in
determining the style of capitalism that prevails in a country
(Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997; Aoki 1988; Hall and Soskice 2001).
Second, corporate governance is not only a fundamental part of a
political economy system, it has also been related to a plethora of
economic and political outcomes. Corporate governance is used in
the economic literature to explain a range of other outcomes: levels
of economic growth and efficiency (Carlin and Mayer 2000, 2003;
Mueller 2005); innovation capability (Allen and Gale 1999; Huang
and Xu 1999); levels of competition (Fulghieri and Suominen 2005);
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financial openness (Stulz 2005); relative prevalence of public and
private companies; levels of control premia (Dyck and Zingales
2004); and the emergence of social democracy (Belloc and Pagano
2005).
There are several ways of categorizing corporate governance
systems. One of the key distinctions is between shareholder and
stakeholder systems of corporate governance (Letza et al 2004).
However, this characteristic is difficult to quantify and, arguably,
all corporate governance systems are stakeholder systems to some
degree (what varies is the distribution of power amongst
stakeholders). In the economics literature, corporate governance is
also measured in terms of blockholding and minority shareholder
orientation. While a blockholding orientation is not entirely
synonymous with stakeholder corporate governance, it is arguably
a necessary condition for it to occur.
Given its multifaceted nature (as well as its conceptual complexity),
the operationalization of corporate governance in empirical studies
displays great variance. As we will make clear below, this paper’s
theoretical claims are fundamentally concerned with capturing the
extent to which the monitoring, oversight and control of the
management of public companies is oriented towards external
minority shareholders. This theoretical goal guides our choice of
dependent variables.
The variable which is most commonly used in cross-section
analyses of corporate governance (ownership concentration) is not
available as a time series. The cross-sectional work in the literature
has been done with data relating to the early/mid-1990s (La Porta
et al 1998; Faccio and Lang 2002). Although a team of researchers
has recently published a more up-to-date snapshot of ownership
concentration—relating to 2004 (Kho et al 2006) - this is still not a
measure of corporate governance that can be employed in an indepth analysis of corporate governance change employing panel
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data econometric techniques. We utilize four alternative proxies for
minority shareholder strength.
The first is stock market capitalization divided by GDP, also known
as “equity share”. A higher equity share is taken to imply a greater
orientation towards external minority shareholders. The issue of
publicly traded equity (i.e. equity listed and traded on a stock
exchange) requires that firms submit themselves to an increased
level of external accountability. In order to buy and hold the equity
of publicly traded companies, external investors need to be
persuaded that companies are being operated in their interests (and
not only the interests of other stakeholders, such as blockholders or
employees). Consequently, a high proportion of publicly issued
equity in the financing of corporate activity may be taken to imply
that firms have been successful in orienting their governance to the
needs of such external minority stakeholders.
There are several possible limitations for using this measure as a
proxy for outsider corporate governance. Firstly, much of an
economy’s public equity market may be held by blockholders.
Although a firm may go public as a means of gaining additional
investment resources from external investors, controlling stakes
may be held by incumbent blockholders. An indeterminate
proportion of national equity markets may thus represent the sunk
investment of insider capital. Secondly, the relative size of an
economy’s equity market may be driven by institutional factors
unrelated to corporate governance. For example, the Netherlands
has a significant private pension sector, which has promoted the
channeling of savings into equity investment (giving rise to a high
equity share). This does not necessarily imply, however, that Dutch
firms are governed with a high minority shareholder orientation.
Similarly, Switzerland has achieved a high equity share due to the
pool of savings arising from its status as an offshore banking
centre.
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We argue, however, that change in equity share, rather than its
absolute level, may still provide a useful indication of changing
patterns of corporate governance. Change is likely to be primarily
driven by the activities of external minority investors; in contrast,
blockholder ownership stakes are likely to be relatively unchanging
(given their strategic rather than short-term profit maximizing
rationale). Consequently changes in equity share, rather than their
levels, should say something useful about changes in minority
shareholder orientation.
Our second proxy is the total value of shares traded on the stock
market divided by GDP. The rationale of this measure is similar to
that of change in equity share. The variable is commonly used as a
measure of the activity or liquidity of equity markets. However, its
level is likely to be more reflective of the minority shareholder
nature of corporate governance than equity share, as blockholder
equity stakes are much less traded (due to their strategic nature)
than those of short-term profit-maximizing portfolio investors.
Consequently, blockholder activities are less likely to distort the
level of this measure.
The third proxy is the value of international equity issuance as a
share of GDP. This is data that is collated by the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS), and relates to equity issuance that is
specifically targeted towards non-domestic investors. It consists of
equity issues falling into three categories: Equity issuance from
domestic corporations in foreign markets; equity issuance from
domestic corporations in foreign currency in the domestic market;
and equity issuance from domestic corporations in domestic
currency in the domestic market targeted at non-domestic
investors. Data refers to both initial public offerings and secondary
equity issuance from existing public companies.
Unlike Equity Share, the level of this proxy is not distorted by the
equity ownership activities of blockholders. It does not include, for
example, issues of equity that are entirely oriented towards
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domestic incumbent ownership groups. The rationale of this proxy
is that companies will have to exhibit outsider friendly governance
if they are to raise significant funds in the market through the
issuance of such stock. Its main limitation is that equity issuance
activity—both IPOs and secondary issues - occurs in cycles,
depending on the current state of market sentiment. Issuance
boomed in the late 1990s, and then more or less dried-up in most
markets in 2000 and 2001. These cyclical movements did not reflect
underlying structural changes in corporate governance, but rather
the volatilities of the credit cycle.
Our final proxy for corporate governance is an index of shareholder
protection that was originally developed by La Porta et al (1998) in
respect of shareholder protections prevailing in the mid-1990s, but
which has been updated up to 2002 by Pagano and Volpin (2005). It
is a summary index of six possible legal protections available to
external shareholders vis-à-vis company management. Each
individual protection is evaluated as a dummy variable (1 =
protection exists, 0 = protection does not exist). Consequently the
score for each country ranges between 0 and 6.
The categories of minority shareholder protections are as follows:
(1) vote by mail, equals one if the law explicitly mandates or sets as
a default rule that the company must provide a proxy form
allowing shareholders to vote on the items on the agenda of a
general shareholders’ meeting by mail; (2) shares not deposited,
equals 1 if the law does not require, nor explicitly permits
companies to require, shareholders to deposit with the company or
another firm any of their shares prior to a general shareholders
meeting; (3) cumulative voting, equals one if the law explicitly
mandates or sets as a default rule that shareholders owning 10% or
less of the capital may cast all their votes for one board of directors
or supervisory board candidate (cumulative voting) or if the law
explicitly mandates or sets as a default rule a mechanism of
proportional representation in the board of directors or supervisory
board by which shareholders owning 10% or less of the capital

10

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 03

stock may name a proportional number of directors to the board;
(4) oppressed minority, equals one if (minority) shareholders
owning 10% or less of the capital stock can challenge (i.e. by either
seeking damages or having the transaction rescinded) resolutions
that benefit controlling shareholders and damage the company; (5)
pre-emptive rights, equals one when the law or listing rules
explicitly mandate or set as a default rule that shareholders hold
the first opportunity to buy new issues of stock; (6) capital to call a
meeting, equals one when capital needed to call a shareholders’
meeting (directly or through the courts) is less than or equal to 10
percent.
Table 1 presents the data for all our dependent variables:
international equity issuance, equity market capitalization, value of
equity traded, and the shareholder protection index. The table lists
the values for all countries included in the analysis in a range of
years. The table makes clear that there is a great degree of crosscountry and temporal variance in our analysis. We will explain in
the following section, why we think that insider labor is an
important explanation of this variation.
[Table 1]
The above table summarizes how our measures for the dependent
variable have changed since the early 1980s. International equity
issuance, equity market capitalization and the value of equity
traded have substantially increased their share of GDP in each of
the countries in our database, suggesting an overall trend towards
more outsider-oriented corporate governance practices at the level
of the firm. These increases have been apparent in both liberal
market economies and coordinated market economies. However, as
the latter have generally started from a much lower base, the
percentage increases in many cases have been significantly higher.
International equity issuance is a more volatile series than equity
share and value traded, due to the more “lumpy” nature of
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primary (rather than secondary) market transactions. In fact, in the
early 1980s, there was very little international equity issuance being
undertaken in many countries. All three series also reflect the
impact of a strong upswing in equity market valuations, issuance
and trading at the end of the 1990s—the so-called “technology
bubble” - which ended with a significant downturn in equity
markets in 2000. However, by 2003/2004 the measures had, in
many countries, started to increase again, although remaining
below the cyclical peaks attained in 1999/2000.
Our regulatory measure of corporate governance change has
exhibited less change over the period for which we have data.
However, the overall trend is, once again, in favor of greater
minority shareholder protections in most countries. One country in
which significant change has been recorded by our regulatory
measure is Italy. Italy has reformed its outsider-hostile regulatory
framework into a system offering similar levels of minority
protections as available to shareholders in liberal market
economies. However, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark and
Switzerland still appear to offer a poor level of protection to
outsider shareholders, at least as of 2002.
Regardless of the extent of change of individual series, the level of
all of the measures reveals the tendency of liberal market
economies (UK, US, Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) to
exhibit a stronger outsider-orientation, whilst the coordinated
market and Mediterranean economies exhibit a weaker outsiderorientation. The main exceptions to this pattern arise from equity
market data relating to the Netherlands, Luxembourg and
Switzerland. The latter two countries are offshore banking centres,
and therefore benefit from “artificially” high inflows into their
domestic capital markets from foreign capital. Netherlands—in
contrast to other coordinated market economies—has a developed
a significant privately-funded pensions sector, which has caused its
equity market to develop significantly relative to its domestic
economy.
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III. THE ARGUMENT: INSIDER LABOR AND INSIDER
CAPITAL
A. WHAT IS INSIDER LABOR?
The traditional conception of social democracy rests on the
assumption that there is a connection between Left government
and labor as a whole. In other work, however, Rueda (2005, 2006
and 2007) has argued that labor is divided into two segments: those
with secure employment (insiders) and those without (outsiders).
Since the early 1970s, insiders have become insulated from
unemployment. Not only do they enjoy high levels of protection,
they also benefit from the fact that outsiders act as a buffer bearing
the brunt of fluctuations in the business cycle.
The starting point for our analysis is that the interests of labor
market insiders and outsiders are fundamentally different and, in
some circumstances, contradictory. In terms of labor market
protection, insiders care about their own job security while
outsiders care about unemployment and job precariousness much
more than about the employment protection of insiders.
The division between insiders and outsiders, therefore, is
essentially related to the unemployment vulnerability of different
actors in the labor market. Insiders are workers with highly
protected jobs. Factors like the nature of employment protection
legislation, a company’s firing and job search costs, insiders’
production process skills and attained levels of company
investment, and the behavior of unions contribute to the level of
protection that characterizes “insiderness.” Insiders are sufficiently
protected by the level of security in their jobs not to feel
significantly threatened by increases in unemployment. Outsiders,
on the other hand, are either unemployed or hold jobs
characterized by low levels of protection and employment rights,
lower salaries, and precarious levels of benefits and social security
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regulations.
The unemployed, the involuntary fixed-term
employed and the involuntary part-time employed are outsiders.1
The differences in the interests of insiders and outsiders have
dramatic consequences for the preferences of both groups
regarding corporate governance. In this paper’s framework, there
are two dimensions in which labor insiders and outsiders diverge:
the levels protection of labor insiders and the openness of the
corporate governance system. Outsiders are not benefited by high
job insider labor protection since it represents a shelter for insiders
from competition from outsiders. In their role as consumers,
outsiders are also not benefited by the limitation in competition
represented by a blockholder-centered corporate governance
system. Labor outsiders, therefore, do support competition in the
labor market and in the corporate governance system. Insiders, on
the other hand, are obviously benefited from high job protection
limiting the competition from outsiders. They are also in favor of a
blockholder-centered corporate governance system since, as we
will make clear below, it represents a system in which both insider
labor and insider capital mutually benefit from limiting
competition.

B. WHAT IS INSIDER CAPITAL?
The distinction between insider and outsider capital is relatively
well established in the corporate governance literature (Franks and
Mayer 1995; Hellwig 2000; Pagano and Volpin 2001). Insider capital
is a category of owner that seeks to establish a significant degree of
direct control over the management of individual public
companies, normally through ownership of a large proportion of
the company’s equity capital. Unlike in a company with a
diversified ownership base, such an ownership strategy reduces the

1 See Rueda (2007: chapter 2), for a more detailed explanation of the differences
between insiders and outsiders.
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scope for a separation of the functions of ownership and control. In
such circumstances, both management and the dominant
blockholder can be viewed as company “insiders” in the sense that
they are able to exert direct control over the company’s assets and
activities.
A public company whose ownership is dominated by insider
capital occupies, in effect, an intermediate position between a
private company and a public company with diffuse ownership. In
the former case, the owner (for example, the founding
entrepreneur) often enjoys full control of the company through
ownership of a large proportion of the company’s equity. However,
the lack of a public listing restricts access to external capital. In the
case of a public company with diffuse ownership, a stockmarket
listing facilitates access to external equity financing from capital
markets, however there are no longer control rights enjoyed by any
single investor (Hellwig 2000).
By securing control rights over a public company, therefore, insider
capital seeks to achieve the best of both the private and public
corporate worlds: access to the increased financing opportunities
associated with a public listing, and retention of the control rights
typically enjoyed by the owners of private companies (Hellwig
2000: 101). Such an ownership structure has been characteristic of
many public companies in the post-war corporate sectors of
coordinated market economies, particularly in continental Europe
(Becht and Mayer 2001).
In contrast, outsider capital describes those owners with relatively
small equity participations in individual companies. Such minority
shareholders tend to be passive holders of a company’s stock. Their
ownership participation is focused on financial returns - through
receipt of dividends and an increased share price. Outsider capital
does not generally seek to influence company performance directly,
e.g. by exerting pressure on company management. In the case of
management underperformance, their main sanction is to sell the
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shares, i.e. to exercise a policy of “exit” rather than “voice”
(Hirschman 1970). Such an ownership policy has been typical of
institutional investors—such as pension funds, mutual funds and
insurance companies—which are the predominant class of
investors in Liberal Market Economies.
In order to acquire control rights, it is necessary for insider-oriented
investors to take substantial positions in the equity securities of
individual companies. Although equity participation in excess of
50% of the votable stock ensures control, it is often possible to
achieve effective control with significantly smaller blockholdings,
e.g. 15-20% or less. This might be possible if the blockholder is able
to coordinate the voting activities of smaller shareholders.
Alternatively, the firm may permit issuance of different classes of
share, some of which may provide multiple votes at company
general meetings. Owners of the latter category of share may,
therefore, be able to attain control whist owning only a relatively
small proportion of the total equity capital.
Smaller blockholdings may also be sufficient for effective control
due to the collective action problem faced by minority
shareholders, who may not be able to mobilize and coordinate the
support of their fellow minority shareholders against the wishes of
a large blockholder. This is likely to be a particular problem if the
ownership stakes of individual minority shareholders are low, e.g.
below 1% of a firm’s total market capitalization, as is typical of an
institutional investor in a Liberal Market Economy.
The portfolio diversification strategy of an outsider-oriented
investor is fundamentally different to that of insider capital.
Outsider investors seek to avoid the high levels of concentration
risk that arise from taking large positions in individual firms. By
investing in the equity of a large number of companies, outsider
capital seeks to benefit from the diversification benefits identified
by modern portfolio theory (Markowitz 1952). However, the price
that is paid for such a diffuse ownership strategy is an inability to
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exert direct control over the management of individual companies.
Unless explicit legal or regulatory safeguards exist to safeguard
their interests (described in the literature as quality corporate law
or minority shareholder protection), minority shareholders’ main
channel of influence over company management is via the effect of
aggregate buying and selling decisions on the company share price,
which plays a role in determining the vulnerability of the firm to
hostile takeover bids (Manne 1965), and the access of the firm to
external financing from equity capital markets.
The cleavage between insider and outsider capital is defined here
in terms of ownership strategy rather than institutional form.
However, within the major industrialized democracies it is possible
to identify categories of organization that are frequently associated
with insider or outsider investment strategies. For example, an
insider capital strategy is generally employed by pyramidal
business groups, which are ubiquitous players in the corporate
sectors of many countries (Morck and Steier 2005; La Porta et al
1999). In such a structure an apex shareholder (often a wealthy
family) directly controls a single company (which may or may not
be publicly listed), which in turn controls large blockholdings in
other companies. A complex web of cross-shareholdings may exist
across the corporate sector, although ultimate control may
ultimately reside with an opaque group of elite actors.
Blockholding has also been pursued in many post-war coordinated
market economies by industrial corporations (through crossshareholdings in other corporations), universal banks (particularly
in Germany and Japan), family networks (e.g. the Wallenberg
family empire in Sweden), the state (e.g. via nationalization or
public investment in “strategic” industries), and a complex mixture
of each of these institutional types. In contrast, outsider capital
behavior is characteristic of institutional investors, such as pension
funds, insurance companies, mutual funds and hedge funds, which
dominate the ownership structure of liberal market economies.

2007] LABOR MARKETS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM

17

Acquiring direct hierarchical control of management is one way of
mitigating potential principal-agent problems between owners and
managers (Stiglitz 1985; Allen and Gale 2000). Rather than relying
on incentives provided by capital market signals, owners can
control more directly the extent to which managers are
administering the firm in their interests. In particular, the
information asymmetries that plague principal-agent relationships
(Jensen and Meckling 1976), e.g. concerning the firm’s technology,
business environment or earning’s prospects, can be minimized
without recourse to a complex institutional framework of financial
contracting vis-à-vis external shareholders. However, once they
have acquired control, there will remain little incentive for insider
capital to support the introduction of corporate governance
safeguards for minority shareholders, e.g. strong non-executive
boards, financial reporting requirements, laws to secure the voting
rights of minorities, etc. The potential agency costs generated by a
weak corporate governance framework are no longer something to
which they are exposed (Rajan and Zingales 2003).
Indeed, in the absence of regulatory safeguards, blockholders may
seek to exploit their position of control to expropriate resources
from minority shareholders via a variety of mechanisms. These
could take the form of directing management to favor chosen
suppliers, choosing management based on non-meritocratic or
dynastic considerations, or requiring management to pursue a
business strategy based on personal objectives rather than profit or
value maximization. At worst, control rights may facilitate the
blockholder’s ability to undertake outright theft of the company’s
assets, or to indulge in insider trading. Each of these (and many
other) forms of self-dealing may ultimately result in insiders
benefiting disproportionately from their investment in a firm—
either in financial or non-financial terms - in relation to minority
shareholders.
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In a similar way to the position enjoyed by insider labor, insider
capital is ultimately representative of incumbent ownership
interests in a political economy. A major concern of any incumbent
is likely to be its ability to sustain that position of incumbency
against potential competition (Morck and Steier 2005: 40).
Incumbents are unlikely to take a positive view of any policy—such
as law and regulation safeguarding the rights of minority
shareholders—that reduces the barriers to entry faced by nonincumbents, and thereby increases the competitive pressure on
their enterprises. Such a perspective is also likely to color their
attitude towards the development of capital markets. Whereas
insider capital has already sunk the capital to finance its existing
operations, and may be able to finance incremental investment
from retained earnings or insider networks, capital markets offer
the potential for non-incumbents to raise funds, and subsequently
threaten the position of existing players. In short, insider capital
may not only view corporate governance reform and the
encouragement of capital markets as unnecessary for its ownership
strategy, but also as a threat to its position of incumbency in the
domestic corporate sector (Rajan and Zingales 2003).
A second major difference between the preferences of insider
capital and outsider capital relates to the way in which they may
operate as political actors. The ownership of control rights in
corporations of strategic national importance by a relatively small
number of influential investors may facilitate their ability to
exercise influence over the political process. As Mancur Olson has
argued, interest groups that can organize themselves—for example,
due to their relatively small size and commonality of interest—will
have a greater chance of becoming significant political actors than
diffusely organized interests, and will bargain with other organized
interest groups at the expense of those interests that are not able to
organize themselves (Olson 1982: 37). As a small and cohesive
group of elite actors, insider capital is potentially able to acquire
political leverage that can be used to protect its incumbent position
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and block the lobbying demands of minority shareholders for law
and regulation to protect their interests relative to blockholders.
In contrast, individual minority shareholders may find it more
difficult to achieve a similar level of direct political influence. The
low level of their investment positions in individual companies will
not accord them the status of major strategic players in a domestic
political economy. Furthermore, their lack of long-term
commitment to individual companies and, more generally, to
national economies is not conducive to a high level of domestic
political legitimacy.
Within individual political economies, outsider capital tends to be
composed of a larger number of individual investors, with a wide
diversity of styles and strategies. Furthermore, many are nondomestic investment institutions, which have no interest in political
involvement in foreign contexts. Just as they are faced with a
collective action problem in exerting control over individual
companies, outsider investors face similar difficulties in unifying
their interests for the purpose of political lobbying. Their main
influence over the political process is likely to result from their
aggregate investment decisions—transmitted via the price
signaling mechanisms of capital markets. The ultimate impact of
such market signals on political outcomes may well be significant.
However, it will be difficult for outsider capital to operate as a
cohesive political actor capable of determining corporate
governance outcomes through participation in domestic
distributional coalitions with other organized social actors.

C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSIDER LABOR AND INSIDER
CAPITAL.
Our argument is driven by the preferences of four social actors:
insider labor, outsider labor, insider capital and outsider capital. As
suggested above, insider labor and outsider labor are assumed to
have opposing preferences in respect of the labor market. Insider
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labor favors policies and practices that provide a high level job
security and favorable conditions of employment for its own
constituents, i.e. those employees already in secure and well-paid
jobs. Outsider labor favors a competitive labor market, offering a
level playing field for all types of employee.
Analogously, insider capital and outsider capital have opposing
preferences in terms of capital markets and corporate governance.
Insider capital wishes to discourage the entry of new competitors
into domestic product markets, and therefore opposes
liberalization of capital markets and the enhancement of minority
shareholder protections. In contrast, outsider capital wishes to
participate in domestic product markets on equal terms with
insider capital, and therefore favors measures that encourage new
market entrants, such as the development of capital markets and
the protection of minority shareholders.
The preferences of capital and labor actors overlap in respect of
product market competition. Both insider capital and insider labor
would like to see limitations on the competitiveness of domestic
product markets, resulting in the generation of product market
rents. Insider capital benefits from these rents directly.2 However,
insider labor also benefits from these rents through higher wages
and improved job security, which are offered to them by insider
capital. Consequently, both insider actors benefit from the rents
generated through the uncompetitiveness of domestic product
markets.

The are also political benefits for insider capital in its alliance with insider labor.
The main objective of insider capital is the retention of a position of corporate
sector incumbency. However, it is by no means obvious that a corporate
framework favoring the interests of existing corporate elites is likely to command
political support. A political coalition with insider labor offers insider capital a
more realistic chance of retaining its incumbency.
2
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The losers in this process are both types of outsider actor. Outsider
labor, as a consumer, has to pay higher prices in uncompetitive
domestic product markets.3 However, unlike insider labor, it does
not receive any benefit from these higher prices in the form of
improved conditions of employment and better job security.
Outsider capital is also a loser. It is unable to gain access to
domestic product markets. And it runs the risk of expropriation of
its capital in cases where it co-invests in a blockholder-controlled
firm in a political economy lacking minority shareholder
protections, as indicated in the previous section.
In short, an insider-dominated economy provides a means of
extracting rents from outsider actors, and passing the benefit of
these rents to insider actors, both in the form of financial rewards
and improved employment conditions. This was the situation
prevailing in the ‘golden age of social democracy’ and beyond. Up
to the 1980s, many European economies were characterized by a
system whose primary purpose was to benefit insiders at the
expense of outsiders via the mechanisms described above. We will
show below, however, that insider labor has seen its power decline
in recent years in most of these countries.
What are the
implications for our argument when insider labor experiences a
reduction in its strength?
The main consequences of a decline in insider labor power derive
from the fact that outsider labor has different preferences vis-à-vis
product market competition. It objects to paying the higher product
market prices that generate the rents for insider labor and insider
capital. It seeks to eliminate these rents by promoting a greater
degree of product market competition.4 One means by which this

This is the situation described by Rogowski and Kayser (2002) as a “producer
orientation”.
4 To use Rogowski and Kayser’s terminology once again, it seeks to move from a
“producer” to a “consumer” orientation (Rogowski and Kayser 2002).
3
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can be achieved is via the liberalization of capital markets and
corporate governance reform, thereby encouraging the entry into
domestic product markets of non-incumbent capital, i.e. outsider
capital.5
Consequently, the weakening of insider labor (and, consequently,
the parallel strengthening of outsider labor) will cause corporate
governance change as a result of two mechanisms. Firstly, a less
insider-oriented labor sector will push for a liberalization of
corporate governance and capital market regulation, in order to
promote the entry of more competitors into domestic product
markets. Secondly, insider capital will recognize that its ability to
secure high rents is less secure. At some point, the discounted value
of its future rental stream will no longer compensate it for the high
level of its concentration risk. Consequently, it will increasingly
focus on ways it can diversify out of its existing concentrated
positions at the highest possible price. The main means of
achieving this will be to adopt corporate governance practices (and
promote regulatory changes) that are favorable to outsider
investors. In other words, the preferences of insider capital vis-à-vis
capital markets and corporate governance will experience a major
shift in an outsider direction as insider labor strength diminishes.
In summary, a corporate governance regime that acts as a barrier to
entry to outsider capital involvement– due to a lack of protections
for minority shareholders—is likely to be reflective of a
distributional coalition between insider labor and insider capital.
We would expect there to be a high level of correlation between
measures of the strength of insider labor and a corporate
governance outcome that is unfavorable to minority shareholders.
However, if the strength of insider labor declines, we would expect

It is important to point out that there is no basis for a partnership between
outsider labor and insider capital, as outsider labor is the ultimate source of
insider rents.
5
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this to be associated with an improvement in the investment
environment for minority shareholders, as measured both by the
actual behavior of company management and the legal and
regulatory regime.

IV. RELATING OUR ARGUMENT TO THE EXISTING
LITERATURE.
A number of theoretical approaches have been utilized to explain
comparative patterns of corporate governance, and why they may
be subject to change. Most of the explicit theorizing in this area has
taken place since the mid-1990s, following the publication of a
number of studies highlighting the extent of variation in corporate
governance practices across a range of developed and emerging
economies (Franks and Mayer 1990, 1997; Claessens et al 1998; La
Porta et al 1999; Barca and Becht 2001; Faccio and Lang 2002).
However, an earlier starting point for an explanation of corporate
governance is the neoclassical economic theory of the firm.
The fundamental insight of neoclassical economic theory is that the
raison d’être of the firm as an organizational entity is the
enhancement of efficiency through the reduction of transaction
costs (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975; Grossman and Hart 1980). This
suggests that efficiency considerations should guide all aspects of a
firm’s organizational structure, including its corporate governance
arrangements. This type of argument has led some commentators
to predict a convergence in national corporate governance regimes.
Companies that do not adopt the most efficient corporate
governance practices—in terms of reducing agency costs—will find
themselves at a competitive disadvantage. Given the intensity of
global competition, such firms are likely to either disappear or
adjust their strategy so as to converge on best practice (Alchian
1950; Stigler 1958; Hayek 1967; Hansmann and Kraakmann 2000).
In particular, firms that adopt outsider- oriented corporate
governance practices will acquire easier and cheaper access to
external funding, given the “weight of money” in the hands of
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outsider-oriented institutional investors in global capital markets
(Hall and Soskice 2001; Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Juergens et
al 2000; Shinn 2000, 2001).
A related argument is that the firm is engaged in an evolutionary
process matching the increasing complexity of the overall economic
environment (Chandler 1990). The culmination of this development
is a situation in which meritocratically-selected professional
managers exert control over the largest public companies, and the
amateurish meddling of family or elite capitalist interests is
eliminated. The model of corporate governance that supports this
development is one of diffuse ownership and minority shareholder
protection, i.e. an outsider system of corporate governance,
equivalent to that prevailing in the Liberal Market Economies,
which frees managers from the direct hierarchical control of
owners. Once again, if firms do not conform to this pattern, they
are likely to become inefficient and ultimately disappear.
A second strand in the economics literature has suggested factors
that might work against the adoption of identical corporate
governance practices. Firms differ in terms of their technology,
scale and scope of activities, and in terms of the size of market in
which they operate. Some activities are more opaque to external
investors than others (e.g. the activities of a technology company
versus a natural resources company). The way in which firms seek
to minimize agency costs may therefore depend on the specific
nature of their economic activities. Different types of corporate
governance arrangements may need to be employed by different
firms in order to reassure external investors that agency costs are
indeed being minimized. This could result in significant firm-level
or sectoral variation in corporate governance outcomes (Gourevitch
and Shinn 2005: 36; Burkhart et al 1997; Carlin and Mayer 2003).
Although influential in the popular discourse on corporate
governance, each of the above arguments has difficulty in
accounting for observable patterns of comparative corporate
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governance. National corporate governance diversity has endured
despite the increased involvement of foreign investors in domestic
equity markets and the lower funding costs obtainable through the
adoption of minority shareholder-oriented governance practices
(Gourevitch and Shinn 2005: 105; Gompers at al 2001).
Furthermore, corporate governance continues to exhibit greatest
variance at the national level, not at the level of the firm or sector of
activity (Stulz 2005; La Porta et al 1998), and corporate governance
regimes appear only loosely related to the level of a country’s
economic development (Rajan and Zingales 2003; Roe 2003; Morck
and Steier 2005). The market incentives favoring outsider corporate
governance do not, therefore, appear sufficient to overcome the
potency of nationally-based explanatory variables—such as the
strength of insider labor—which we argue remain the most
influential determinants of comparative outcomes.
An alternative approach to corporate governance has been
developed by legal scholars, following seminal articles by La Porta
et al (1997, 1998). Three propositions emerge from this literature,
each of which may be evaluated separately. The first is that the
legal and regulatory environment is an essential determinant of
corporate governance outcomes (this contrasts with an implicit
assumption of the economic theory of the firm: that corporate
governance outcomes will be determined by the private behavior of
independent economic agents). The “law matters” perspective
asserts that law is required to shape the incentives of rational
actors, and thereby determine the nature of firm-level corporate
governance behavior (Schliefer and Wolfenzon 2002).
The empirical evidence regarding this assertion is mixed. A
number of countries—such as the UK and Canada—have
historically developed a minority shareholder-oriented governance
regime in the absence of significant legal or regulatory incentives.
The legal protections for minority shareholders identified as crucial
for corporate governance by La Porta et al have only been
introduced into developed economies in the relatively recent past
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(Franks et al 2004; Morck et al 2004). Furthermore, there are several
prominent examples of countries that possess significant legal
protections for minority shareholders, and yet continue to be
dominated by blockholders (Roe 2003: 7). Our analytical
framework takes an agnostic position on this issue. We utilize both
regulatory and behavioral measures of corporate governance as
proxies for our dependent variable, implying both a recognition of
the importance of the regulatory framework and a need to evaluate
the direct impact of our explanatory variables on actual corporate
governance outcomes.
A second proposition from the legal literature is that corporate
governance outcomes are primarily determined by a specific kind
of law and regulation: namely, the corporate and securities law
directly relating to minority shareholder protections. Although
general tort law, for example, provides an underlying framework
for the enforcement of contracts, it is arguably insufficient to
determine the nature of a corporate governance regime. Equally,
law or regulation which is not directly focused on corporate
governance, e.g. labor law, competition law, etc, will not be
instrumental in driving firm-level corporate governance behavior
(La Porta et al 1998).
This narrow focus on corporate and securities law is criticized by
Gourevitch and Shinn (2005), who point to the empirical value of
considering the impact of a wider range of law and regulation in
determining corporate governance outcomes. In particular, they
argue that all laws affecting the overall “degree of coordination” of
an economy are of relevance. This includes laws relating to the
labor market, competition policy, training and education, the
regulation of financial institutions, pension legislation, etc. Such an
outlook draws on Hall and Soskice’s (2001) view that corporate
governance will be structured to be “complementary” with the
other component part of a political economy. Our theoretical claims
are compatible with these two perspectives (we accept that laws
and regulations both specific and beyond corporate and securities
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law are relevant to corporate governance outcomes), but we
emphasize the influence of a more political factor: the strength of
insider labor.
Perhaps the most controversial component of the “law matters”
approach to corporate governance is the hypothesis that legal
origin is the key determinant of corporate and securities law
orientation. According to this argument, a key distinction exists
between countries that have developed on the basis of common
law, and those inheriting a civil law tradition. Common law
systems are characterized by judicial independence, the importance
of precedent and less emphasis on codification relative to civil law
systems. In contrast, the civil law tradition has given rise to a more
centralized legal system, with insistence on codification, and
consequently a greater potential scope for state-driven political
influence (Rajan and Zingales 1999).
Although La Porta et al (1998: 1147) present cross-sectional
evidence linking a country’s legal family and its corporate
governance (measured as ownership concentration), their analysis
is highly dependent on the historical period chosen (the mid1990s). The significant historical variation of corporate governance
outcomes over the last century casts doubt on the validity of a
explanatory variable such as legal origin which is time invariant
(Rajan and Zingales 2003; Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). We argue
that this paper’s explanation of corporate governance is in a better
position to explain corporate governance change due to its
observable variation over time.
The explanation of corporate governance outcomes in terms of
political alliances between social actors has been explored by a
number of scholars (Cyert and March 1963; Aoki 1986; Jackson et al
2004; Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). Gourevitch and Shinn (2005), for
example, utilize a framework with three social actors—investors,
employees and management—and consider the corporate
governance outcomes of six possible coalitions between these
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actors. Their contention is that a “corporatist compromise”—
between employees and management—best describes the coalition
that has driven corporate governance outcomes in post-war
continental Europe, while a co-called “investor model”—between
owners and management - is the political alliance that has
prevailed in the UK and US.
Our theoretical framework shares with Gourevitch and Shinn the
perspective that some kind of social partnership between capital
and labor has driven corporate governance outcomes in
coordinated market economies. However, as Gourevitch and Shinn
themselves recognize, their chosen classes of social actor —
management, employees and investors—may be too broad to offer
significant explanatory power. Although they subsequently
identify the distinction between insider and outsider capital as
relevant for corporate governance outcomes, our analysis
highlights the importance of recognizing an equivalent insideroutsider cleavage in labor.
Several frameworks have been proposed linking political
institutions to corporate governance. Using Lijphart’s (1999)
typology of political institutions, several writers have noted a
correlation between majoritarian institutions and minority
shareholder-oriented corporate governance outcomes, and between
consensus political institutions and blockholder outcomes
(Gourevitch et al 2003; Pagano and Volpin 2005). According to
Gourevitch and Shinn (2005), consensus political institutions and
insider corporate governance are complementary components of a
political economy which seeks to promote credible commitments
amongst economic actors and a willingness to invest in specific
assets. Majoritarian institutions engender more uncertainty in
terms of policy formation, and therefore necessitate more flexible
corporate behavior. Such adaptability is complementary with more
outsider-oriented corporate governance, which encourages
management to constantly adapt in response to changing market
signals.
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Pagano and Volpin (2005) make a similar link between political
institutions and corporate governance via a formal median voter
model. According to their argument, a PR electoral system tends to
increase the probability of coalition government. This leads to an
increase in the focus of government policy on the preferences of
homogeneous political groupings, which they assume are social
actors favoring weak protections for minority shareholders. In
contrast, their framework suggests that majoritarian systems will
emphasize the importance of pivotal groups that are less politically
aligned, which they assume are actors supporting minority
shareholders (Pagano and Volpin 2005, p.1006). Perotti and von
Thadden (2001) also present a median voter model, which
determines outcomes in terms of alliances between shareholders,
employees and creditors.
The difficulty of utilizing political institutions to explaining
corporate governance outcomes is similar to that relating to the
legal origin argument: the largely static nature of the explanatory
variable (although there have been some limited recent examples of
significant electoral system change; Norris 2004). Consequently, we
once again emphasize the significance of our proposed model as an
explanation of temporal, as well as cross-national, corporate
governance changes.
The idea of financial openness driving the capital market
orientation of the financial system—and by implication the outsider
nature of corporate governance—is explored by Rajan and Zingales
(2003). In a similar manner to this paper’s analysis, they argue that
incumbent blockholders will oppose an equity-oriented financial
system because the latter increases the competitiveness of the
business environment. Capital markets offer a source of financing
to new entrants, which could lead to an erosion of the “positional
rents” of incumbents. However, the increased openness of the
economy—either in terms of trade or capital flows—serves to
increase the competitiveness of the economy independently of
changes to the financial system. In such circumstances, incumbents
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are more willing to accept reform of the financial system, i.e. a shift
to a financial system based on capital markets, as they have less to
lose from such a change (Rajan and Zingales 2003: 7). The likely
concomitant of such a shift will be a willingness to accept corporate
governance reform in favor of minority shareholders.
As the authors themselves acknowledge, a potential criticism of
this argument is its endogeneity. Why would incumbents agree to
greater openness in the first place if the result was deterioration in
their competitive position (Gourevitch 1986; Rogowski 1989;
O’Rourke and Williamson 1999)? Rajan and Zingales argue that
many countries have no choice but to open-up; they are small and
are located close to other countries, and they seek to test this by
showing that country size is significant as an instrument for
openness in their regressions on financial development. They also
argue that - if openness is associated with greater overall prosperity
- countries will not wish to fall behind their neighbors who are
benefiting from such prosperity, and will therefore be driven to
open-up. Nonetheless, the danger remains that openness and
financial market outsiderness are endogenous variables whose
correlation is primarily reflective of their mutual dependence on a
third explanatory variable. Our argument is that this additional
variable is the strength of insider labor. It should also be noted that
Deeg and Perez (2000) find no correlation between the introduction
of capital mobility changes in Spain, France, Italy and Germany,
and the advent of financial sector and corporate governance reform
(Deeg and Perez 2000: 142).
The role of labor in driving corporate governance outcomes has
been highlighted in the work of Mark Roe (1994, 2003). However, in
contrast to our theoretical perspective, Roe’s argument is not based
on a social partnership between employees and owners. Roe argues
that incumbent capital is forced to take concentrated ownership
stakes in order to counter the political power of labor (which the
latter manifests through its ability to deliver Left governments). As
blockholders they can exert direct hierarchical control over
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management to counter the strength of labor. In contrast, minority
shareholders cannot exert this type of direct control over
management. They are faced with agency costs spiraling out of
control as management will be more influenced by the wishes of
employees (operating through the intervention of left government)
than minority shareholders. Consequently Left labor power is
associated with blockholding, and labor weakness with a
shareholder model of corporate governance.
In a recent paper Cioffi and Höpner (2006) claim—based on
qualitative case studies relating to France, Germany, Italy and the
US - that recent shifts towards a minority-shareholder orientation
have primarily been promoted by centre-left parties, contrary to
what would be expected according to Roe’s explanatory
framework. Cioffi and Höpner’s rationalization of this policy stance
is that partisan opponents on the centre-right are too enmeshed
with the interests of existing managerial elites, and are therefore
unwilling to support regulatory change favoring minority
shareholders. In contrast, political entrepreneurs on the Left see
corporate governance reform as an opportunity to undermine
capitalist incumbents, and also present a modernist image that
reaches out beyond core constituents. This leads centre-left
parties—ironically –to adopt a more neo-liberal policy stance in
corporate governance than that adopted by the centre-right.
Our own theoretical claims differ from both of these competing
perspectives. Unlike Roe, our argument is cast in terms of the
relative strength of a particular cleavage of labor rather than the
absolute strength of labor as a whole.6 According to Roe’s
approach, if labor in general is strong, the result will be a greater
orientation to Left government and policies favoring a
blockholding corporate governance outcome. However, our

6 Rueda (2005, 2006 and 2007) convincingly argues that identifying Left
government (or Social Democracy) with labor as a whole is a mistake.
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argument is centered on the position of a particular labor actor that
in practice represents a limited proportion of the labor force. We
argue that it is the strength of this sub-group—rather than labor in
general—that is key to determining corporate governance
outcomes.
Secondly, our analytical framework emphasizes—in contrast to
Roe—the role of a social partnership between labor and capital in
determining corporate governance outcomes in coordinated market
economies. We disagree with the notion that insider capital is in a
position to counter labor in a political economy in which labor is a
dominant actor. If incumbent capitalist are dominant over the
behavior of companies (which, according to Roe, is the main
purpose of blockholding), it seems likely that there will be
significant collaboration from labor-dominated Left governments.
The fact that incumbent capitalists interests are permitted to retain
their key role in corporate governance in political systems
characterized by strong Left labor is suggestive of the existence of
some kind of social partnership or quid pro quo.

V. THE ANALYSIS: VARIABLES AND
METHODOLOGY.
We test our hypotheses with data for a maximum of 18 OECD
countries between 1976 and 2004.7 The countries included in the
sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US.
We measure the power of insider labor with three different
variables: employment protection, wage growth in manufacturing
and hours worked in manufacturing. The justification for these

7 The availability of the data limits our analysis to fewer observations in some
regressions, see details below.
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variables is pretty straightforward. High levels of employment
protection insulate insiders from unemployment vulnerability and
competition from insiders. Employment protection is, in fact, an
essential part of the definition of “insiderness.” We therefore
expect employment protection to be a reflection of insider power
and to determine changes in corporate governance. We also argue
that the power of insider labor is captured by higher wage growth
and lower working hours in manufacturing. When insiders are
significant in an economy, we expect them to dominate the
manufacturing sector (it would be more complicated to make this
argument about the service sector, for example). The power of
insider labor should therefore be correlated with better working
conditions, both in terms of wages and working hours. Our
argument is based on the existence of a partnership between
insider labor and insider capital. We explained above that this
partnership relies on extracting rents from outsiders.
We
hypothesize that these rents are reflected in higher wages and
lower working hours for insiders in the manufacturing sector.
A number of different options exist for measuring the levels of
employment protection in OECD countries. For the analysis in this
paper, we will use a variable provided in Baker, Glyn, Howell, and
Schmitt (2004). The data were created by joining together several
series: an original one from Lazear (1990), an update using OECD
data from Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), and a further update and
interpolation from Nickell and Nunziata (2000).8 The variable
ranges from 0 to 2, where higher values mean stricter employment

It is important to note that the OECD data, used from 1985 onward, is
constructed on the basis of a more extensive collection of employment protection
dimensions. Lazear’s index measures the severance pay and advance notice a
blue-collar worker with ten years of service receives upon termination without
cause. The OECD index is constructed by averaging the scores obtained by each
country in three categories: “procedural inconveniences which the employer
faces when trying to dismiss employees; notice and severance pay provisions;
and prevailing standards of and penalties for unfair dismissal” (OECD 1999: 54).
8
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protection. We measure growth in manufacturing wages as the
percentage annual change in the hourly compensation costs for
production workers in manufacturing (in US$).9 Finally, we use a
variable capturing the hours worked in manufacturing as the
average per week.10
[Table 2]
Table 2 provides some summary statistics for our explanatory
variables. The table presents the means, standard deviations,
minimum and maximum values for our four measures of insider
labor power. The table makes clear that there is great degree of
both cross-national and temporal diversity in these variables.
The previous section has made clear our expectations regarding the
effects of insider labor on corporate governance. There are,
however, a number of additional variables that we want to control
for in our analysis. These are factors that we do not have explicit
theoretical expectations about, but that a number of authors in the
comparative political economy literature have suggested should
corporate governance.
To take account of the possible impact of economic factors on
corporate governance, three commonly utilized “economic”
variables are included in our analysis: the rate of GDP growth, the
level of GDP per capita and the rate of consumer price inflation. In
most studies of corporate governance, GDP growth is considered as
a dependent variable to be explained by corporate governance
(Carlin and Mayer 2000, 2003). However, inclusion of GDP growth
as a control provides a means of testing the claim that corporate
governance is driven by efficiency or economic performance
considerations. Such a theory suggests some kind of a link between

9

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Source: ILO LABORSTA.

10
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a superior economic performance and the adoption of minority
shareholder-oriented corporate governance. Inclusion of GDP per
capita is a way of testing the idea that higher levels of economic
development are associated with a greater minority shareholder
orientation.
The rate of consumer price inflation has not been explicitly linked
to corporate governance by the economics literature. However, it is
included here due to its potential impact on several of the proxies
that are being utilized for the dependent variable, such as the
relative size and turnover of equity markets. In particular, the rate
of inflation provides a way of controlling for the effect of cyclical
factors that may exert a short-term effect on equity market
valuation and issuance, but which are independent of the state of
corporate governance. Interest rates would provide an alternative
means of controlling for these cyclical effects; however, they are
likely to be highly correlated with inflation, and are therefore not
included as well.
Our regressions attempt to control for the possible effects of the
legal origin argument through the inclusion of dummy variables
that highlight the common law, Germanic or Scandinavian legal
origins of a country’s legal system. The default option—if a country
is coded as a zero for each of these three dummy variable
categories—is a French civil law legal tradition.
We include a binary control variable in our regressions to allow for
the proportional or majoritarian nature of electoral rules. As has
been discussed, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that corporate
governance may be related to country size. Consequently,
population is also included as a control variable in our regressions,
to allow for the possibility that smaller countries may experience
greater pressure to favor the interests of minority shareholders.
This also controls for the possible effects of demographics as an
explanatory variable, which has been suggested by some
commentators (O’Sullivan 2000).
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Finally, our regressions include left and right partisanship control
variables (from Armingeon 2005), which can be used to assess the
contrasting claims of Roe (2003) and Cioffi and Hoepner in respect
of the corporate governance policy orientation of left government.
The specification adopted in the empirical analysis is as follows:
Yit= β0+β1Yit-1+β2X1it+…+βnXnit+εit
where β0 represents a general intercept, X1 to Xn are the
explanatory variables, β1 to βn are the slopes of the explanatory
variables, and εit denotes the errors.
We present results for two models. First, we estimate random
effects and specifying no heteroscedasticity. The existence of
country-specific factors not included in the analysis (countryspecific omitted variables) could affect the accurate estimation of
our model. Like most analyses in comparative political economy, it
is reasonable to assume that there are a number of country-specific
effects that cannot be introduced explicitly into our models (specific
historical circumstances, difficult to capture institutional
developments, etc). To deal with these the variables, we produce a
set of estimates with random effects.11
We also performed a modified Wald test for heteroscedasticity.
This test, however, revealed a significant amount of
heteroscedasticity. We therefore present a second set of results with
panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs). Beck and Katz (1995)
show that PCSEs are consistent when there is heteroscedasticity.

An alternative would be to estimate models with fixed effects, but our need to
include time-invariant explanatory variables in our analysis makes this
impossible. For details on estimating random effects with panel data, see Hsiao
(1986).

11
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VI. RESULTS
The results of our analyses are presented in Tables 3 to 6. In each
table we use an alternative measure of corporate governance and
different models in each table reflect alternative measures for
insider labor power. We present both the random effects (RE) and
the PCSE results side by side. We present the estimates for our
measure of insider power first and then those for the rest of
explanatory variables.
[Tables 3 to 6]
The tables make clear that our two methods to estimate the effects
of insider labor power make very little difference to the results.
Because of the results of the modified Wald test for panel-specific
heteroscedasticity mentioned above, we will refer to the PCSE
results in the paragraphs below.
Employment protection emerges as a very significant determinant
of corporate governance in Tables 3 to 6. While employment
protection is not a significant determinant of international equity
issuance (Table 5), it is clearly associated with less equity market
capitalization (Table 3), fewer shares traded (Table 4) and lower
values in the index of minority shareholder protection (Table 6).12 It
is clear then that higher levels of employment protection for insider
labor promote a more blockholder dominated system of corporate
governance.
A similar picture emerges when we measure insider labor power as
wage growth in the manufacturing sector. While wage growth in

These results are only present in the models with PCSEs and are not confirmed
in those with random effects.

12
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manufacturing is not a significant determinant of the index of
minority shareholder protection (Table 6), it is clearly associated
with less equity market capitalization (Table 3), fewer shares traded
(Table 4) and less international equity issuance (Table 5).13 As in the
previous two cases, this measure of insider labor power promotes a
system of corporate governance dominated by insider capital.
The effects of hours worked in manufacturing as very similar to
those of wage growth (although, as suggested by our model, in the
opposite direction). While hours worked in manufacturing are not
a significant determinant of the index of minority shareholder
protection (Table 6), they are significantly associated with more
equity market capitalization (Table 3), more shares traded (Table 4)
and more international equity issuance (Table 5). As insider labor
gets weaker (and hours in manufacturing increase), corporate
governance becomes more open to minority shareholders.
Turning now to our control variables, the results for the legal origin
dummies are mixed. The common law and Scandinavian law
dummies are often positive and significant, while the coefficient of
the German dummy is often insignificant. We include a dummy
variable in our regressions indicating the proportional or
majoritarian nature of electoral rules. Our results show a significant
negative relationship with our regulatory proxy for corporate
governance (confirming Pagano and Volpin’s results). With the rest
of our corporate governance measures, however, the relationship is
rarely significant and it does not retail its negative sign.
Our regression analysis includes a control variable for trade
openness—measured by imports plus exports as a share of GDP—
and capital openness, which takes the form of a dummy variable

The lack of significance when analyzing the index of minority shareholder
protection may be caused by the fundamentally cross-sectional nature of the
dependent variable.

13
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indicating whether capital controls are present or not. Our results
suggest that there is a positive and significant relationship between
trade openness and our three proxies for actual corporate
governance outcomes. However, the relationship is less convincing
with respect to our regulatory proxy for corporate governance
(although the latter is a much shorter time series). The capital
controls dummy does not exhibit much significance in explaining
any of our dependent variable proxies. As we do not look at the
interaction of trade openness and capital controls, our results are
not directly comparable with those of Rajan and Zingales.
However, our result is broadly compatible with their theoretical
claims, although it is subject to the same endogeneity problem that
they identify.
Rajan and Zingales use country size—as measured by population—
as an instrument for trade openness in their empirical analysis.
Population is also included as a control variable in our regressions,
although it is used in addition to trade openness rather than as a
substitute. Our results offer no evidence of a significant
relationship between population and our regulatory proxy for
corporate governance. However, the relationship with our three
measures of actual corporate governance behavior is statistically
significant in some regressions, and positive in sign, i.e. size of
country tends to suggest a more shareholder governance
orientation. Once again, this appears to be broadly consistent with
Rajan and Zingales results, although our analysis is not entirely
comparable.
Our regressions include left and right partisanship control variables
(from Armingeon 2005), which can be used to assess the contrasting
claims of Roe (2003) and Cioffi and Hoepner (2006) in respect of left
government. Our results offer some support for Cioffi and
Hopner’s claims. The coefficient on the Left government variable is
invariably positive, indicating that more left-wing governments are
associated with more minority shareholder-oriented corporate
governance outcomes over the estimation period. However, the
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statistical significance of this result is quite unstable, depending on
which corporate governance proxy is used. Contradicting Roe
(2003), there is certainly little evidence of a simple negative
relationship between left government and blockholding.

VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have explained corporate governance change in
terms of the relative strength of a particular cleavage of labor:
insider labor. It is the strength of this sub-group—rather than labor
in general—that is most relevant for the determination of corporate
governance outcomes. Insider labor affects corporate governance
via its relationship with a particular type of shareholder actor:
blockholders (or insider capital). Similar corporate governance
outcomes would not be expected in a system where blockholders
did not exist, even if insider labor was a powerful actor. Nor is the
power of insider labor necessarily synonymous with Left
government, in contrast to the Labor power-Left government axis
suggested by Roe (2003).
Our empirical results are also not supportive of a negative
relationship between Left partisanship and shareholder-oriented
corporate governance. Our data suggests that causation has
recently been operating quite differently. Left government appears
to be heavily implicated in the shift towards shareholder-oriented
corporate governance. However, unlike Cioffi and Höpner (2006),
we do not argue that the changed relationship between
partisanship and corporate governance is reflective of a volte face in
the material interests of left or right-wing party political actors.
Rather, we believe that partisanship is interacting in a complex
manner with changes in the relative strength of insider labor. It is
the latter that is the underlying source of recent variation in
corporate governance. The precise nature of the interaction of
insider labor with partisanship is the subject of a future paper.
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Table 1: Corporate Governance in Industrialized Democracies
Australia

1980

International equity issuance divided by GDP

1985

1990

1995

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

0

0.0012879

0.0016097

0.0092521

0.0167799

0.0095298

0.0105288

0.0112474

Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

0.3129979

0.5089837

0.3464832

0.6578772

0.9580936

1.012937

0.9287608

1.120894

1.229933

Value of equity traded divided by GDP

0.0575194

0.0906499

0.1266434

0.2646715

0.5816625

0.6513509

0.7200109

0.7080033

0.8319433

4

4

4

4

Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)

Austria

International equity issuance divided by GDP

0

0.0012369

0.0017011

0.0073525

0.0010517

0.0073003

0.0035555

0.0175796

Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

0.0225862

0.0686658

0.0709762

0.1382706

0.1572141

0.1288925

0.1634206

0.1462524

0.3025632

Value of equity traded divided by GDP

0.0013212

0.0102357

0.115092

0.1095473

0.0492883

0.0381245

0.0283058

0.0427099

0.0839626
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2

3

3

3

Belgium

International equity issuance divided by GDP

0.0012071

0

0.0007229

0.0254057

0.0035225

0.0065388

0.0039749

Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

0.0823125

0.2519377

0.331931

0.3793998

0.799319

0.730218

0.5321929

0.573256

Value of equity traded divided by GDP

0.0068806

0.0226455

0.032585

0.0551207

0.1665078

0.1810103

0.1381608

0.1242248

2

2

2

2

Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)

0.0140068

Canada

International equity issuance divided by GDP

0.0002852

0.0001742

0.0030945

0.0082657

0.0051086

0.0073118

0.0019848

0.0110231

Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

0.4459516

0.4192071

0.4213226

0.6298015

1.178748

0.9944102

0.7910613

1.062704

1.201838

Value of equity traded divided by GDP

0.0925435

0.2050711

0.187867

0.8643542

0.8891956

0.6549149

0.5602022

0.5545095

0.6686107
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5

5

5

5

Denmark

International equity issuance divided by GDP

0

0.0007499

0.0022193

0.0063201

0.0018837

0.0046415

0

0.0148122

Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

0.0788834

0.2523008

0.2929141

0.3119405

0.6804575

0.5962347

0.4452951

0.5740818

0.6227289

Value of equity traded divided by GDP

0.0008473

0.0212925

0.0832709

0.1439333

0.5786663

0.4431857

0.2992329

0.3161672

0.4382986

2

2

2

2

Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)

Finland

International equity issuance divided by GDP

0

0.0007301

0.0046256

0.0366957

0.0164984

0.0121611

0.0012355

0.0085746

Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

0.0412958

0.1077114

0.1658932

0.3402714

2.448893

1.571104

1.055224

1.051993

0.9848251

Value of equity traded divided by GDP

0.0069524

0.009235

0.0287161

0.1465222

1.723388

1.477007

1.341264

1.009848

1.205016
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3

3

3

3

France

International equity issuance divided by GDP

0.0001349

0.0009835

0.0034743

0.0131018

0.0121096

0.0064861

0.008489

Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

0.0916096

0.1065493

0.2576529

0.3358822

1.095576

0.8173499

0.5501564

0.6769475

Value of equity traded divided by GDP

0.0169763

0.0197885

0.0957995

0.2345468

0.8203884

0.7497817

0.5318389

0.4970463

3

3

3

4

Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)

Germany

1980

International equity issuance divided by GDP

Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

0.0802663

1985

1990

1995

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

0.0023278

0.0004787

0.0024812

0.0215476

0.0031795

0.0027189

0.007074

0.0061892

0.2673605

0.2124487

0.23485

0.6791735

0.5775566

0.3454122

0.4490031

0.4400637
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Value of equity traded divided by GDP

0.0170697

0.1041304

0.300242

Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)
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0.2332979

0.5716369

0.7649995

0.6082242

2

3

3

3

0.5442781

0.5680395

Greece

International equity issuance divided by GDP

0

0.0011894

0

0.0017842

0.0042645

0.0097739

0.0150984

0.0073746

Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

0.061794

0.0186265

0.1811281

0.1451211

0.9887943

0.7380803

0.5041941

0.6192899

0.6157374

Value of equity traded divided by GDP

0.001762

0.0004139

0.0466737

0.0518132

0.8484403

0.3187789

0.1869817

0.2241073

0.2200569

3

3

3

3

0.0075227

0.0126645

0.0068174

0.0041077

0.0026022

0.0092613

0.3884269

0.8641669

0.7333388

0.492407

0.5534154

0.6215156

Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)

Ireland

International equity issuance divided by GDP

Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

0

0.1274233

0
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0.1953945

0.1523118

0.2194615

0.2703167

4

4

4

4

0.2863018

0.2480208

Italy

International equity issuance divided by GDP

Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

Value of equity traded divided by GDP

0.0002346

0.0000907

0.0032812

0.0053035

0.0053191

0.0023605

0.0040182

0.0107038

0.056367

0.1372483

0.1349498

0.1909651

0.7149137

0.4836676

0.4021965

0.4187399

0.4721411

0.0191024

0.0323332

0.0386128

0.0792071

0.7242576

0.5155395

0.455155

0.451682

0.5820334

1

5

5

5

Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)

Japan

International equity issuance divided by GDP

Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

0.3572602

0

0.0002961

0.0000379

0.0018331

0.0016577

0.0006293

0.0014648

0.0017087

0.7215347

0.9598598

0.694161

0.665229

0.5409942

0.520908

0.6866301

0.7694935
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Value of equity traded divided by GDP

0.1690545

0.2897926

0.5271546

Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)
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0.2331135

0.4878779

0.4387484

0.3941675

4

4

4

5

0.4954152

0.696464

Luxembourg

International equity issuance divided by GDP

0

0.0180489

0.0055302

0.0765171

0.0050862

0.0094427

0.0037741

0.0995408

Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

0.7695358

3.189147

0.9435971

1.683547

1.735224

1.209646

1.159119

1.409004

1.610108

Value of equity traded divided by GDP

0.0066412

0.0090701

0.0078513

0.0113368

0.0614687

0.0219723

0.0231819

0.0157759

0.0206756

0.0022713

0.0027141

0.0077143

0.0685304

0.029687

0.0157724

0.0140762

0.0116066

0.4494429

0.4065158

0.8593768

1.727981

1.193264

0.959401

Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)

Netherlands

International equity issuance divided by GDP

Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

0.1644742

48

Value of equity traded divided by GDP

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

0.028623

0.1276789

0.1363783

Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)

[VOL. 03 NO. 03

0.5993201

1.827147

2.691279

1.104824

2

2

2

2

0.9061214

New Zealand

1980

International equity issuance divided by GDP

Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

Value of equity traded divided by GDP

1985

1990

1995

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

0

0

0

0.0038333

0.0076899

0.0150177

0

0.0020063

0.3836002

0.2025526

0.5253467

0.3577594

0.3417978

0.3631249

0.4153447

0.4386861

0.040939

0.0443163

0.1382344

0.2066901

0.1620266

0.1246971

0.1317172

0.171249

4

4

4

4

0.003379

0.0095862

0.0235657

0.0015735

0.0067918

0.0151898

Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)

Norway

International equity issuance divided by GDP

0.0015709

0.0025838
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Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

0.0501206

0.1580776

0.2250499

0.3013164

0.389644

0.406827

0.33657

0.434314

0.5653397

Value of equity traded divided by GDP

0.0013198

0.0294854

0.1205434

0.165029

0.3602263

0.3083163

0.2564486

0.3168295

0.5432885

4

4

4

4

0.0071309

Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)

Portugal

International equity issuance divided by GDP

Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

Value of equity traded divided by GDP

0

0

0.0046624

0.0178476

0

0

0.0067614

0.0063953

0.0077993

0.1287533

0.1712234

0.5700017

0.4216764

0.3514151

0.3940862

0.000067

0.0002031

0.0236069

0.0394722

0.5107617

0.2482778

0.1667757

0.1450246

3

4

4

4

0.0025677

0.014953

0.0042764

0.0056472

Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)

Spain

International equity issuance divided by GDP

0.0005819

0.0003922

0.0026233

0.0065561
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Value of equity traded divided by GDP
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0.0754646

0.1137132

0.2211763

0.3385718

0.8975711

0.8008968

0.7044637

0.8659647

0.9487927

0.004434

0.0196807

0.080328

0.1023497

1.754943

1.431067

1.547608

1.115088

1.217498

4

4

4

4

Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)

Sweden

International equity issuance divided by GDP

Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

Value of equity traded divided by GDP

0.0009563

0.0012492

0.0048355

0.0454986

0.0100265

0.0219846

0.0036471

0.0155887

0.09946

0.3566432

0.3835137

0.717457

1.370548

1.059901

0.7429855

1.06111

1.090813

0.0133678

0.1052292

0.0694802

0.3755418

1.628078

1.374483

0.906429

0.8746751

1.337213

3

3

3

3

0.002859

0.0410168

0.0279397

0.036434

0.0156192

0.011684

Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)

Switzerland

International equity issuance divided by GDP

0.0140468

0.0004241
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Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

0.3388718

0.9030107

0.6787062

1.377452

3.217654

2.080267

2.232193

2.271357

2.306478

Value of equity traded divided by GDP

0.1195037

0.453214

0.2198946

0.987702

2.47375

1.200891

2.392721

1.797998

2.196045

2

2

2

2

Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)

UK

International equity issuance divided by GDP

0.000439

0.0035371

0.0050225

0.0221628

0.0215251

0.0094647

0.0045128

0.0099491

Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

0.3827458

0.7200342

0.8578528

1.240424

1.790388

1.549615

1.141645

1.351525

1.315302

Value of equity traded divided by GDP

0.0574518

0.2222952

0.3189664

0.5695137

1.316939

1.308205

2.557039

2.019084

2.417757

5

5

5

5

1995

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)

USA

1980

1985

1990
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0.0000474

0.000448

0.0013518

0.0070999

0.002419

0.000124

0.0002363

0.0001278

Equity market capitalization divided by GDP

0.5188438

0.5507509

0.5272098

0.9269999

1.538564

1.363592

1.050293

0.7130752

0.8636631

Value of equity traded divided by GDP

0.1469136

0.236286

0.3017804

0.6905693

3.245653

2.867378

1.736237

0.6046872

0.8214002

5

5

5

5

Shareholder protection index (6=highest, 0=lowest)
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Table 2:
Variable
|
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max |
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+
Employment
Protection
|
|
overall | 1.092545
.5650517
.1
2 |
between |
.5635979
.1
1.909833 |
within |
.1404808 -.0040064
1.435994 |
Wage Growth
Manufacturing
|
|
overall | 6.473011
11.61639 -28.43137
45.61404 |
between |
.9622613
4.588679
7.875384 |
within |
11.57863 -27.63195
44.21166 |
Hours Worked
Manufacturing
|
|
overall | 39.08175
2.197446
34.8
46.8 |
between |
2.589281
36.29091
46.7 |
within |
.4887782 37.59084
40.62175 |
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Table 3: The Determinants of Corporate Governance,
Measured as Equity Market Capitalization (US$ mn) / GDP
RE

PCSE

RE

PCSE

RE

PCSE

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Employment

-0.176

-0.180

Protection

(1.76)

(2.19)*

Wage Growth

-0.003

-0.004

(Manufacturing)

(2.39)*

(2.53)*
0.168

0.168

(5.03)**

(5.45)**

Hours Worked
(Manufacturing)
Left

0.000

0.001

0.001

0.002

0.005

0.005

Government

(0.32)

(1.80)

(1.59)

(2.78)**

(2.56)*

(3.90)**

Right

-0.000

0.002

0.000

0.002

0.003

0.003

Government

(0.14)

(3.54)**

(0.19)

(3.48)**

(1.71)

(2.72)**

Common Law

0.302

-0.052

0.552

0.048

0.032

0.032
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Legal Origin

(1.89)

(0.84)

(2.56)*

(0.61)

(0.17)

(0.22)

German

0.003

-0.015

0.150

0.120

-0.389

-0.389

Legal Origin

(0.02)

(0.16)

(0.78)

(2.27)*

(2.08)*

(2.23)*

Scandinavian

0.117

-0.149

0.317

-0.082

0.086

0.086

Legal Origin

(0.76)

(2.44)*

(1.48)

(1.29)

(0.38)

(0.28)

Capital
Controls

-0.006

-0.116

0.015

-0.114

0.417

0.417

(0.17)

(2.87)**

(0.33)

(2.36)*

(1.39)

(2.89)**

0.023

0.020

0.030

0.031

0.048

0.048

(3.90)**

(3.12)**

(3.74)**

(3.30)**

(1.36)

(1.47)

0.011

0.020

0.009

0.026

0.038

0.038

Capita

(4.27)**

(6.25)**

(2.89)**

(5.83)**

(3.40)**

(3.13)**

Trade

0.006

-0.001

0.010

0.000

0.003

0.003

Openness

(3.75)**

(1.17)

(6.16)**

(0.60)

(1.23)

(1.31)

Inflation

-0.010

-0.003

-0.010

-0.003

0.008

0.008

(2.36)*

(0.55)

(1.88)

(0.46)

(0.23)

(0.24)

GDP Growth

GDP per
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0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

-0.000

-0.000

(2.38)*

(0.03)

(3.08)**

(0.74)

(0.74)

(1.03)

-0.053

-0.005

-0.082

-0.038

-0.384

-0.384

(3.44)**

(0.27)

(4.15)**

(1.92)

(4.38)**

(4.17)**

-0.097

0.033

-0.216

-0.024

0.423

0.423

(1.01)

(0.60)

(1.77)

(0.43)

(2.08)*

(2.26)*

0.159

0.248

-0.311

-0.074

-6.285

-6.285

(0.68)

(1.76)

(1.42)

(0.57)

(5.09)**

(5.41)**

Observations

370

370

394

394

110

110

Countries

18

18

18

18

14

14

Corporatism

Proportionality

Constant

Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant
at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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Table 4: The Determinants of Corporate Governance,
Measured as Value of Shares Traded (US$ mn) / GDP
RE

PCSE

RE

PCSE

RE

PCSE

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Employment

-0.127

-0.183

Protection

(1.57)

(2.36)*

Wage Growth

-0.003

-0.005

(Manufacturing)

(2.54)*

(3.61)**
0.127

0.127

(4.94)**

(5.32)**

Hours Worked
(Manufacturing)
Left

-0.001

-0.001

-0.000

-0.000

0.003

0.003

Government

(1.17)

(1.47)

(0.54)

(0.51)

(1.82)

(2.97)**

Right

-0.001

0.000

-0.001

-0.000

0.000

0.000

Government

(1.42)

(0.01)

(1.77)

(0.55)

(0.20)

(0.31)

Common Law

-0.034

-0.088

0.071

0.086

-0.375

-0.375
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Legal Origin

(0.24)

(1.06)

(0.39)

(2.06)*

(2.58)**

(3.20)**

German

0.366

0.050

0.497

0.124

0.030

0.030

(2.77)**

(1.29)

(2.47)*

(1.90)

(0.20)

(0.27)

Scandinavian

0.190

-0.081

0.383

-0.020

-0.069

-0.069

Legal Origin

(1.48)

(1.71)

(1.91)

(0.38)

(0.39)

(0.39)

Capital Controls

0.027

0.003

0.094

0.048

1.310

1.310

(0.91)

(0.10)

(2.32)*

(1.09)

(4.46)**

(3.89)**

0.017

0.018

0.027

0.027

0.023

0.023

(3.66)**

(3.97)**

(3.68)**

(3.57)**

(0.84)

(1.08)

0.005

0.016

0.007

0.023

0.034

0.034

Capita

(2.74)**

(5.35)**

(2.23)*

(5.64)**

(3.69)**

(3.34)**

Trade

0.007

0.000

0.011

0.002

0.005

0.005

Openness

(5.51)**

(0.36)

(7.12)**

(2.36)*

(2.47)*

(2.95)**

Inflation

-0.006

-0.000

-0.007

-0.002

0.019

0.019

(1.79)

(0.07)

(1.51)

(0.31)

(0.72)

(0.87)

Legal Origin

GDP Growth

GDP per
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0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

(4.18)**

(0.69)

(5.41)**

(1.76)

(0.02)

(0.02)

-0.026

-0.013

-0.032

-0.038

-0.268

-0.268

(2.20)*

(1.34)

(1.81)

(2.85)**

(3.88)**

(4.89)**

-0.110

0.007

-0.192

-0.047

0.284

0.284

(1.42)

(0.23)

(1.74)

(1.52)

(1.79)

(2.48)*

-0.190

0.131

-0.736

-0.217

-5.073

-5.073

(0.97)

(1.21)

(3.53)**

(2.04)*

(5.30)**

(5.29)**

Observations

360

360

385

385

109

109

Countries

18

18

18

18

14

14

Corporatism

Proportionality

Constant

Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant
at 1%.
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Table 5: The Determinants of Corporate Governance,
Measured as Value of International Equity Issuance (US$ bn) / GDP
RE

PCSE

RE

PCSE

RE

PCSE

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Employment

-0.002

-0.000

Protection

(1.11)

(0.20)

Wage Growth

-0.000

-0.000

(Manufacturing)

(2.99)**

(3.87)**

Hours Worked

0.001

0.001

(Manufacturing)

(1.56)

(2.01)*

Left

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Government

(0.82)

(1.74)

(3.13)**

(4.26)**

(3.67)**

(5.84)**

Right

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Government

(0.77)

(1.51)

(2.72)**

(4.16)**

(2.38)*

(4.08)**
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Common Law

-0.002

-0.001

-0.001

-0.004

-0.014

-0.014

Legal Origin

(0.64)

(0.79)

(0.41)

(3.24)**

(4.68)**

(4.51)**

German

0.000

-0.001

0.007

0.000

-0.000

-0.000

Legal Origin

(0.05)

(1.73)

(1.76)

(0.01)

(0.03)

(0.03)

Scandinavian

0.002

-0.000

0.006

-0.000

0.004

0.004

Legal Origin

(0.64)

(0.08)

(1.53)

(0.18)

(1.07)

(1.03)

Capital Controls

-0.001

-0.002

-0.000

-0.001

-0.000

-0.000

(1.48)

(2.63)**

(0.04)

(1.75)

(0.11)

(0.19)

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.001

0.000

0.000

(1.31)

(1.72)

(1.20)

(2.78)**

(0.22)

(0.25)

GDP per

0.000

0.000

-0.000

0.000

-0.000

-0.000

Capita

(0.17)

(1.77)

(0.42)

(2.02)*

(0.37)

(0.41)

Trade

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Openness

(2.99)**

(0.94)

(7.07)**

(5.24)**

(5.62)**

(4.40)**

Inflation

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

0.001

0.001

GDP Growth
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(2.65)**

(2.39)*

(0.84)

(0.92)

(1.33)

(1.56)

0.000

-0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

(0.72)

(2.53)*

(2.40)*

(0.48)

(2.30)*

(3.00)**

-0.001

-0.001

-0.002

-0.002

-0.006

-0.006

(1.98)*

(2.47)*

(3.38)**

(4.21)**

(4.60)**

(3.82)**

0.002

0.001

-0.001

0.002

0.009

0.009

(1.05)

(1.15)

(0.44)

(1.59)

(2.81)**

(2.46)*

0.001

0.004

-0.012

-0.002

-0.032

-0.032

(0.33)

(1.54)

(2.67)**

(0.83)

(1.61)

(1.94)

Observations

271

271

307

307

116

116

Countries

18

18

18

18

14

14

Population

Corporatism

Proportionality

Constant

Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant
at 1%.
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Table 6: The Determinants of Corporate Governance,
Measured as Index of Minority Shareholder Protection
RE

PCSE

RE

PCSE

RE

PCSE

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Employment

0.254

1.123

Protection

(0.68)

(5.24)**

Wage Growth

-0.005

-0.006

(Manufacturing)

(0.97)

(1.08)

Hours Worked

-0.041

-0.041

(Manufacturing)

(0.86)

(0.85)

Left

0.002

0.002

0.004

0.002

0.002

0.002

Government

(0.97)

(0.88)

(1.76)

(0.85)

(0.78)

(0.87)

Right

0.002

0.003

0.004

0.002

-0.001

-0.001

Government

(0.82)

(1.33)

(1.49)

(0.80)

(0.44)

(0.45)

Common Law

2.479

3.581

1.973

2.124

2.094

2.094
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(5.13)**

(12.00)**

(6.13)**

(11.49)**

(7.07)**

(7.64)**

German

0.446

0.300

0.224

-0.018

-0.081

-0.081

Legal Origin

(1.17)

(1.11)

(0.61)

(0.06)

(0.31)

(0.29)

Scandinavian

1.113

1.198

0.782

0.674

1.163

1.163

(3.14)**

(5.44)**

(2.22)*

(2.65)**

(3.85)**

(4.79)**

0.062

0.469

0.051

0.534

-0.172

-0.172

(0.35)

(2.24)*

(0.24)

(2.19)*

(0.37)

(1.33)

-0.008

-0.037

0.028

0.026

-0.003

-0.003

(0.32)

(1.50)

(0.88)

(0.90)

(0.07)

(0.07)

GDP per

0.003

0.036

-0.002

-0.005

0.004

0.004

Capita

(0.20)

(3.07)**

(0.14)

(0.45)

(0.25)

(0.31)

Trade

-0.002

-0.001

-0.003

-0.008

-0.001

-0.001

Openness

(0.54)

(0.36)

(0.89)

(2.28)*

(0.29)

(0.33)

Inflation

-0.093

-0.150

-0.085

-0.121

-0.061

-0.061

(2.40)*

(3.15)**

(2.03)*

(2.61)**

(1.02)

(0.95)

Legal Origin
Capital Controls

GDP Growth
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0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

(0.92)

(0.90)

(1.30)

(0.26)

(0.74)

(1.13)

0.135

0.227

0.148

0.294

0.099

0.099

(1.40)

(3.17)**

(1.46)

(3.89)**

(0.71)

(1.08)

-1.083

-1.360

-0.932

-1.122

-0.933

-0.933

(3.00)**

(10.21)**

(2.52)*

(7.03)**

(3.28)**

(6.49)**

2.243

0.265

2.622

3.034

4.384

4.384

(2.76)**

(0.41)

(4.83)**

(7.44)**

(2.56)*

(3.21)**

Observations

108

108

144

144

96

96

Countries

18

18

18

18

14

14

Corporatism

Proportionality

Constant

Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant
at 1%.
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